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John W. Murphy
The Consumer is not Necessarily a Citizen
(Vartotojas nebûtinai esti pilietis)
Santrauka. Ðiame straipsnyje nagrinëjamos socialinës pilietinës visuomenës formavimosi sàlygos, svarstomi
poþiûriai á dabartinæ ekonominiø idëjø kaità, aptariami prieðtaravimai, kurie kyla dël to, kad netinkamai su-
plakami vartotojo ir pilieèio terminai. Daugiau dëmesio skiriama kolektyvinës praktikos sampratai.
Pilietinë visuomenë esti socialinio solidarumo pagrindas. Nors ðis poþiûris nëra naujas, èia pabrëþiama, kad
pilietinë visuomenë svarbi priimant ástatymus bei kitas normas, kurios siekia iðvengti susvetimëjimo, kad pilietið-
kumo samprata apima kur kas daugiau negu tik organizacijas, egzistuojanèias uþ pagrindiniø visuomenës insti-
tucijø. Pilietinë visuomenë nëra savaime suprantamas dalykas. Tai nëra tik profsàjungos, vietiniai klubai ir nefor-
malios organizacijos. Daug svarbiau yra tai, kaip ðios organizacijos, kurios iðreiðkia darnià diskutuojanèiø ir
polemizuojanèiø pilieèiø veiklà, susijusios su kolektyvine praktika.
Per pastaruosius dvideðimt metø, silpnëjant Johno Maynardo Keyneso idëjø poveikiui, susiformavo naujas –
neoliberalus – poþiûris á ekonomikà. Vienas pagrindiniø Keyneso principø yra tas, kad prekyba ir kiti mainø bûdai
yra socialinë veikla. Visi yra tos paèios sistemos dalis, taigi visoms socialinëms klasëms (tiek darbininkø klasei,
tiek elitui) bûdingas bendras likimas. Vadinasi, siekiant bendrojo gërio, turi bûti laikomasi kooperacijos principø.
Kadangi subalansavimo galimybë esti gana trapi, bûtinos darnios pastangos.
Taèiau nuo 9-ojo deðimtmeèio pradþios ðios koncepcijos pamaþu atsisakoma, o tarpusavio priklausomybës
idëja suprantama kaip ekonominës raidos ir asmeninës laisvës suvarþymas. Keyneso idëjas keièia Friedricho von
Hayeko koncepcija, teigianti, kad kolektyvinis pradas yra mitas, o socialinë tvarka formuojasi spontaniðkai
rinkos sàveikø aplikose. Hayeko poþiûriu, kolektyvinë atsakomybë yra ne tik beprasmis dalykas, bet ir esminis
ekonomikos stabdis. Neoliberalizmo plitimas daro nebemadingà socialinës sutarties sampratà, nes, Hayeko
poþiûriu, santykiai tarp individø yra prekiniai ir trumpalaikiai. Atsisakoma minties (kaip pasenusios ideologijos),
kad þmonës yra esmingai tarp savæs susijæ ir turi bendrus interesus. Tuo tarpu Keyneso koncepcinis vaizdinys –
visiðkai kitoks. Svarbiausias dalykas tas, kad asmenys vaizduojami kaip pilieèiai, kurie susijæ su kaimynais ir
platesne visuomene. Kaip tik todël tikimasi, kad jie laikysis teisingumo ir neðaliðkumo idealø. Ðioji koncepcija
nëra abstrakti, ji reikalauja nuolatinio budrumo ir noro veikti, kai tik ðito prireikia.
Ðiandienà ðie poþiûriai yra nesuderinami. Problema ta, kad asmenys, kurie yra socializuoti kaip vartotojai,
raginami gana sparèiai tapti pilieèiais. Hayeko poþiûriu, individai tampa pilieèiais tik dalyvaudami rinkoje. O Keyne-
so teigimu, toks pilietinio ásitraukimo bûdas yra nepakankamas, jis negali sukurti lanksèios ir demokratinës visuo-
menës. Veiksmingam pilietiðkumui reikia gerokai platesnio poþiûrio ir aktyvesnio socialinio dalyvavimo negu tik
rinkos nauda grindþiamos taisyklës. Stingant aktyvios socialinës sutarties, pilietinë veikla yra labai apribojama.
Rinka yra klaidinanti – pilietinio lavinimo ir ðvietimo poþiûriu – metafora, kuri vaizduoja pernelyg atsijusius,
atomizuotus ir abejingus individus. Rinkos reguliuojama visuomenë sudaryta ið besivarþanèiø ir prieðiðkø asme-
nø, o socialinë sritis apibûdinama kaip darinys, susidedantis ið „kliûèiø“, kurias turá áveikti sëkmës siekiantys
individai. Sakykim, socialiniai ásipareigojimai tariamai riboja individø gebëjimà greitai ir veiksmingai prisitaikyti
prie rinkos pokyèiø.
Taèiau galima plëtoti ir kitas metaforas. Juk netinka sakyti, kad visuomenë esti tik netiesiogiai – geriausiu
atveju – susijæ atomai. Naujieji modeliai atsiþvelgia á tiesioginæ sàveikà tarp visuomenës daliø. Be to, jie neátraukia
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„aukðtesnës tvarkos“ principø, kurie vadinami nematoma rinkos ranka, koordinuojanèia savarankiðkø elemen-
tø veiksmus. Ðie modeliai rodo, kad socialinës tvarkos principai yra intersubjektyvûs – socialiai konstruojami ir
diskursyviai plëtojami.
Kadangi socialinë aplinka nëra laisvai pasirenkama ir iðorinë (kaip, sakykim, rinkos – nematomos rankos -
atveju), svarbu tai, kaip asmenys ávertina savo veiksmø poveiká kitiems asmenims. Jie turi ásipareigojimà iðsaugoti
socialinës asociacijos integralumà, vadinasi, negali nepaisyti kitø asmenø egzistavimo bûdø. Iðsaugoti toká ben-
dravimo stiliø – tolygu tartis ir diskutuoti dar prieð imantis veiksmo.
Pilietinë visuomenë, prieðingai negu abstrakti rinkos erdvë, sudaro ásipareigojanèià sritá, kurià iðsaugo
kolektyvinis, intersubjektyvus veiksmas. Todël ne rinka, bet pilietinis diskursas yra ekonominës sàveikos pa-
grindas. Sugráþimas á ðià sritá yra teisëtas ir gali atnaujinti gyvenamàjá pasaulá. Vadinasi, pilietinë visuomenë yra
galimybë iðvengti susvetimëjimo, kurá diegia rinka. Kadangi rinka ir pilietinë visuomenës grieþtai atskiriamos,
intersubjektyvi ekonominio reguliavimo kilmë yra ið esmës deformuojama. Pilietiðkumas negali bûti efemerið-
kas dalykas. Kai pilietá pakeièia vartotojas, demokratija susiduria su rimtomis problemomis, nes be abipusio
pasitikëjimo, saugumo ir kolektyvinës atsakomybës visuomenë pasmerkta iðtirpti á daugybæ atomø, kurie vieni
kitus kaltina, átarinëja ir kurie yra nesaugûs. Taigi pakartotinai verta kelti esminá sociologijos klausimà: kaip ir
kodël egzistuoja visuomenë?
Introduction
During the past twenty years life has
changed dramatically in the United States and
the rest of the world. The focus of this paper is
the shift that has taken place with respect to a
particular set of ideas. A new image of the
economy has gained popularity, which has had
enormous social implications. Stated simply, the
philosophy of Keynes is in decline, while neo-
liberalism has become the centerpiece of most
discussions about the economic life.
One of the principle assumptions of Keynes’
work is that trade and other modes of exchange
are social activities (Keynes 1997). In order for
the economy to retain a sense of equilibrium,
systematic and regular interventions are needed.
The implied message is that all social classes share
a common fate, and that commodious relation-
ships must be maintained between the working
class and elites. Everyone is basically part of the
same system, and thus cooperation is necessary
to insure the survival of the common good. Per-
sons depend on one another for the smooth de-
livery of goods and services, and, as Keynes sug-
gests, this balance is quite fragile and can be
maintained only through a concerted effort.
At the beginning of the 1980’s, however,
this imagery was cast aside. The Keynesian
theme of interdependency was presumed to
stifle economic growth and personal freedom.
To counteract the influence of Keynes, the work
of Hayek was introduced and widely dissemi-
nated. Central to Hayek’s perspective on the
economy is that the collective is a myth, and
that order emerges spontaneously through the
myriad of transactions that occur at the mar-
ketplace (Hayek 1944).
For Hayek, collective responsibility is not only
meaningless, but a serious drag on the economy.
Policies that are designed to correct social im-
balances, in other words, thwart competition,
distort the market’s signals, and generate wide-
spread inefficiency. As a result, the generation
of wealth slows and everyone suffers, especially
the entrepreneurs who are presumed to be the
primary source of economic stimulation.
As part of the general acceptance of neo-
liberalism, the social contract is presumed to be
passé. Consistent with Hayek’s position, rela-
tionships between persons are simply monetary
and fleeting. Associations are optional and
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forged mostly to facilitate specific projects;
these alliances are predicated on convenience
and momentary needs. The idea that persons
are essentially bound together and share inter-
ests is dismissed as an outmoded ideology.
Within the intellectual context supplied by
Hayek, persons owe nothing to one another,
except perhaps the right to be left alone.
What has emerged from this new economic
framework is a rendition of the person that dif-
fers greatly from the version assumed by Keynes.
According to Hayek’s economic worldview, per-
sons are primarily customers or consumers. Their
needs are met at the marketplace, and thus they
should always comport themselves as traders.
After all, traders are rational, efficient, and
unaffected by issues that reduce their ability to
compete. Traders are not swayed by proposals
or arguments that are idealistic and lack imme-
diate utility. Indeed, a pragmatic attitude is at
the core of successful trading.
With Keynes, however, the imagery is dif-
ferent. Most important at this juncture is that
persons are portrayed as citizens. They are es-
sentially linked to their neighbors and the wider
society, and therefore are expected to promote
ideals such as justice and fairness. Every citizen
is obliged to express concern for the welfare of
others, and strive to eliminate any obstacles that
might impede their development. This impera-
tive is not abstract, but requires continued vigi-
lance on the part of persons and a willingness
to act or intervene when necessary.
Clearly these two models of the person are
incompatible. The problem nowadays is that per-
sons who have been socialized to be consumers
are suddenly asked to behave as citizens. None-
theless, according to Hayek, individuals become
citizens only by participating in the market. But
from a Keynesian viewpoint, this sort of civic
involvement is insufficient to create an inclu-
sive and democratic society. Effective citizen-
ship requires a much broader vision and more
extensive social participation than is considered
to be wise or profitable at the market.
In the absence of an extensive social con-
tract, civic activity is very limited. Market rela-
tionships are based on what Erich Fromm calls
negative freedom–persons do not meddle in the
affairs of others (Fromm 1958; 119–141). In fact,
any talk of intervention is equated with becom-
ing a nuisance. But if fundamental to democ-
racy is the promotion and protection of social
diversity–ranging from political opinions to
lifestyles – consumerism will not necessarily lead
to this ideal. Only a strong commitment to a
social contract will support this end.
The Rise of the Market and Civic Duty
Various Latin American writers have been
arguing for quite some time that most contem-
porary societies are governed by the “Total
Market” (Serrano Caldera 1995; 16–7). In ad-
dition to the emphasis that is placed on the mar-
ket as the most appropriate regulatory mecha-
nism, a particular body of values has inundated
the entire globe. As a result, a unique and re-
strictive worldview appears to be all-encompass-
ing and represents the epitome of rationality
and fairness. Similar to the insights revealed by
Marcuse in One-dimensional Man, the consumer
is extolled as fundamentally rational, even
handed, and fair, and thus becomes the para-
gon of success (Marcuse 1964). Anyone who
deviates from this role, accordingly, deserves to
be ineffective and marginalized.
The centerpiece of this conception of the
person is a specific understanding of individu-
alism. In terms of this model, the person is alone,
motivated almost exclusively by personal con-
cerns, and ultimately free. In short, persons are
atoms who pursue their own “preferences”, as
both classical and neo-liberal economists say, and
through the efforts of the market are united, as
least momentarily (Assmann 1997; 89–90).
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In an almost magical way, personal greed
and ambition is translated into the common
good. At times even Adam Smith was skeptical
of this transformation, and thus he argued that
important moral principles must be instilled in
all traders to avoid anarchy (Smith 1976). None-
theless, neo-liberals abhor this sort of interfer-
ence in the market. They believe that human
nature is sufficient to guarantee that chaos will
not erupt; exhibiting too much greed is simply
assumed to be a threat to everyone and some-
thing to be tempered. This type of self-control
is rational and supports the claim that the mar-
ket enables all informed and disciplined trad-
ers to prosper.
As should be noted, success at the market
does not require that persons consult one an-
other regularly. In fact, intentional collabora-
tion is indicative of the manipulation that dis-
torts the market. In this respect, alliances are
ephemeral because they are merely correctives
that are needed temporarily to reestablish equi-
librium at the marketplace. Under normal con-
ditions, traders are adversaries who are em-
broiled in a zero-sum game, and thus they view
one another as impediments to their own self-
expression and advancement. And because the
freedom of each individual is unencumbered,
others are nothing more than barriers that must
be overcome on the path to success.
Where does civic participation fit into this
scenario? The answer to this question is quite
simple: the common good is addressed only in-
directly through the pursuit of personal gain.
The assumption is that individual success is syn-
onymous with social improvement; the common
good is advanced as a natural by-product of
personal triumphs. But what about the possi-
bility of a few powerful persons reaping huge
benefits, while the remainder of society is im-
poverished? Adding these gains and losses to-
gether may create a positive outcome, although
a large portion of society may experience down-
ward mobility. Although these examples could
be multiplied, collective action is supposed to
be avoided at all cost.
Social improvement is simply not the result
of collaboration. Emotion, not reason, is exer-
cised collectively. Hence wealth is not a social
product that can be created or distributed ef-
fectively through welfare or other interventionist
policies. Rather, wealth is personal property
that individuals should be allowed to invest as
they see fit. Huge individual gains, for example,
must be encouraged to “trickle down” to those
who have not been so successful. According to
this laissez-faire scheme, the social impact of
trading is an afterthought. No-one has the right
to demand that personal aspirations be molded
or altered to foster the good of society.
As this conceptual framework is applied to
other facets of society, problems are not diffi-
cult to envision. Viewing themselves to be con-
sumers, persons treat one another as competi-
tors. Additionally, they are suspicious of one
another’s motives and see no benefit in collabo-
ration. And as they continue to confront this
hostile world, strategies that relate to self-pro-
tection become very important. Withdrawal
from society increases, and civic responsibility
becomes merely a platitude. Genuine solidarity
is lost, while persons engage in hollow rituals in
an attempt to recapture a collective spirit. They
long for camaraderie that is touted to be anath-
ema to their individual needs. As Marx described
this process, persons are alienated completely
from their “species-being” or general sense of
humanity (Marx 1973; 111–5).
Consumer as Citizen–A Dangerous Mix
Consumers are not necessarily problematic
to the polity as long as they remain on the pe-
riphery of the political process. If persons are
confined, for example, to listening to info-
mercials and periodically casting individual bal-
lots, this model is sufficient. Clearly these are
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not collective activities and are indicative of
passive or “low intensity” democracy (Serrano
Caldera 1995). Social atoms are fully capable
of absorbing input, processing these data, and
making decisions based on a predetermined list
of options. But if more intense participation is
required or solicited to make a polity functional,
problems can easily begin to escalate.
In view of the September 11 attacks, many
Americans feel insecure and vulnerable. They
desire to recapture a sense of solidarity and com-
munity. In other words, they want to become
citizens and live in a supportive and protective
polity. Consistent with the views of Locke, they
want the state to defend and provide them with
a tranquil environment, so that their everyday
routines can return to normal. Perhaps even
more important is that government officials are
imploring them to become more vigilant and
involved in their neighborhoods. The claim is
that through this participation they will be able
to detect threats and prevent other attacks or
similar disasters.
But these persons have not been trained as
citizens, and thus do not have the skills required
to create actively a commodious polity. At this
time, for example, most persons do not know
their neighbors or their neighborhoods. They
have not been involved directly in neighbor-
hoods associations, and thus have not engaged
in serious discussions or debates, or any other
significant exchange of ideas, with their neigh-
bors. Consequently, these persons do not have
much insight into the behavioral patterns ex-
hibited by others in their community. Taking
control of this environment, therefore, is not
thought to be possible. The focus of any citizen
is thus likely to be self-protection and increas-
ing personal security – through more police
surveillance or the purchase of guns, locks, or
other devices–that only promote isolation. A
type of siege mentality, in other words, can be
inadvertently spawned.
Because persons are atoms, a neighborhood
is basically a threatening place. Unknown indi-
viduals are encountered who are pursuing pri-
vate aims. Given this situation, something ab-
normal becomes easily synonymous with any-
thing different. In the absence of solidarity, vigi-
lance amounts to little more that voyeurism.
Persons view others from distance and make
decisions about their demeanor from afar, with-
out an accurate basis for this sort of evaluation.
Superficial traits, as might be expected, become
the criteria for making determinations about
deviance or threats. Anything that is different
becomes a warning signal.
What neighbors need are trustworthy cri-
teria for making accurate interpretations of be-
havioral change. They must distinguish clearly
difference from what is truly out of the ordi-
nary. This analysis demands that persons grasp
the values, beliefs, and commitments that sus-
tain and guide their neighbor’s actions. These
elements unveil, in more sociological terms, the
life-world (lebenswelt) of a community (Husserl
1954). Accordingly, these mores provide the key
to understanding precisely various behaviors and
any changes in their patterns. Having knowl-
edge of this normative base supplies the con-
text that is essential for judging accurately a
person’s intentions.
But consumers eschew such intervention,
and simply orient themselves in terms of rules
that are accepted as valid for everyone. To be
specific, the market projects empirical signals
that any rational or normal human being should
be able to recognize.
Nonetheless, the norms that govern a
neighborhood are not this obtrusive or obvious.
They are embedded within a biography that has
been modified in many ways, and reflects a
plethora of histories, cultures, and futures. At
the confluence of these factors is where mutual
understanding is forged. At the nexus of lan-
guage games, as Lyotard writes, is where a com-
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munity exists (Lyotard 1984). A consumer, in
short, is reluctant to consult others in the man-
ner necessary to appreciate these sources of
norms. At the marketplace, for example, cul-
tural diversity is not a legitimate explanation
for failure, but an excuse for a lack of discipline
or preparation.
As consumers, persons have no real respon-
sibility for the larger environment, such as their
neighborhoods. Suggesting that they should
enter into this domain in order to avert threats
or violence will likely only create additional
anxiety for the citizenry. Because persons do
not really know one another everyone becomes
an object of suspicion, thus promoting a height-
ened sense of peril and insecurity. And as they
become aware of what they do not know, per-
sons can easily be overwhelmed by the ensuing
ambiguity. Increased withdrawal from this source
of threat is likely to follow.
Citizenship and New Social Imagery
The market is the wrong metaphor to de-
scribe the generation and education of citizens.
Persons are too disconnected and unrespon-
sive to one another according to this imagery.
When regulated by the market, a society is com-
prised of competitors and balkanized; the so-
cial realm is imagined to be filled with obstacles
that successful persons learn to avoid. Exten-
sive social commitments, for example, limit the
ability of persons to adjust quickly and effi-
ciently to changes in the market. Profitable in-
vestment strategies cannot be encumbered in
this way.
Other metaphors are available, however,
that convey a different image of social exist-
ence. The systase, rhizome, and quilt are dif-
ferent in two important respects from the mar-
ket (Murphy 1989). First, the components of
the whole, or in this case society, are not thought
to be atoms that are, at best, indirectly related.
And second, according to these new models,
order emerges only through direct contact be-
tween the parts. In none of these alternatives is
a higher-order principle, such as an “invisible-
hand”, introduced to coordinate the actions of
independent elements. In a more social sense,
there is no room in these images for self-ab-
sorbed agents who are oblivious to their sur-
roundings.
Take the quilt as an example. A quilt con-
sists of numerous patches that are sutured to-
gether at their edges. The whole, therefore, re-
flects the contrasts that are revealed through
the parts. The general idea is that the parts are
not isolated and unrestricted, but are bound
together in a productive or mutually beneficial
manner. In fact, the significance of each part
depends on the surrounding patches; each patch
has integrity only within the overall pattern.
The quilt announces a vision of society that
is more consistent with citizenship than the mar-
ket. Especially noteworthy is that the social con-
tract is not optional–persons are illustrated to
act always in the presence of others. Like the
patches of a quilt, individuals are joined at their
peripheries. Their actions, as phenomenologists
argue, are co-constituted, and thus individual
behavior is never devoid of social implications.
Order, in other words, is fundamentally
intersubjective and is inaugurated and main-
tained through on-going discourse between
persons (Levinas 1987).
Effective individual action, therefore, re-
quires that persons consult one another regu-
larly, since they are basically linked together.
Because this arrangement is not irrelevant, op-
tional, or an afterthought, as at the market,
persons have a responsibility to appreciate how
their actions affect others. They have the obli-
gation to preserve the integrity of this associa-
tion, and therefore must not disregard or vio-
late the existence of others. Mutual consulta-
tion before acting is basic to the preservation
of this style of community.
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As is suggested by the quilt, others are not
abstractions who are merely part of a cost-ben-
efit analysis that is conducted before acting. They
are not a means to be manipulated, used, tricked,
or dismissed. Each person as a member of the
quilt has integrity, meaning, a purpose, and le-
gitimacy that must be protected in any plan of
action. Stated differently, every person represents
an Other – a truly unique Other – that must not
be ignored or distorted in any way. In the end,
any insensitivity to others would destroy the equi-
librium or harmony present in a quilt.
The quilt suggests a new morality that is con-
sistent with the demands of citizenship. Differ-
ent from the market, persons are encouraged to
engage, consult, and cooperate with one another.
The common good is everyone’s primary concern,
rather than the interests of a few idealists or
dreamers. Within this framework, self-concern
goes hand in hand with concern for others; in-
terest in the other is no longer presumed to lessen
the prospects for personal happiness. Happiness
is not associated any more with a mythical sense
of unencumbered freedom.
A key part of this new morality is that per-
sons are expected to intervene when the integ-
rity of others is jeopardized. Again opposed to
the marketplace, intervention is not an aberra-
tion or destructive. Intervention is a duty of all
citizens when someone in their community is
attacked or discriminated against in some man-
ner. Indeed, interpersonal commitment such as
this is essential to maintaining a brotherhood
of persons. Promoting the welfare of others is
an aspect of citizenship that no-one can abdi-
cate without serious social consequences.
Civil Society and Solidarity
Civil society is beginning to receive some
attention as a possible base of social solidarity.
This focus, of course, is not altogether new.
Writers as different as Rousseau and Hegel have
believed that civil society has an important role
in establishing laws and other norms that are
not intrusive and alienating. Whereas tradi-
tional institutions such as markets are abstract,
bureaucratic, and insensitive to daily affairs,
neighborhood organizations are not. In more
current parlance, popular organizations emerge
from below and embody the will of all denizens.
As should be noted, the term civil society
in this context does not refer to organizations
that simply exist outside of traditional or main-
stream institutions. Civil society, in other words,
is not discovered necessarily in labor unions,
consumer groups, or local clubs. Each of these
examples can be reified and restrictive as any
governmental agency. What is unique about
current discussions of civil or popular organiza-
tions is that these groups are thought to reflect
collective praxis (Sartre 1979; 505–24). Rather
than predetermined, these associations gain
their purpose and character from citizens act-
ing in concert. And in line with the new social
imagery, these groups arise from below through
discourse, debates, and other modes of direct
consultation that are endemic to civil society.
Contrary to the abstract space of the mar-
ketplace, civil society constitutes an embedded
realm that is supported by collective, inter-
subjective action. Through this exercise of col-
lective will, institutions are given their form and,
if necessary, changed. But in terms of the mar-
ket, these unofficial organizations represent the
underside of society. They exemplify the irra-
tional forces that must be socialized and gradu-
ally disciplined to fit into the market.
From the perspective of civil society, how-
ever, the market is an abstraction. Critics such
as Hinkelammert argue that the market is noth-
ing but a social construction, which prescribes a
particular way that persons should define them-
selves and their relationships to others (Hin-
kelammert 1995; 238–9). The market, in other
words, is a product of civil society that has drifted
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away from this foundation and appears to be
autonomous. Hinkelammert’s point is that civil
discourse, and not the market, is the base of eco-
nomic interaction, and that a return to this realm
is warranted and can rejuvenate social life.
Civil society is thus a remedy for the alien-
ation that has been spawned by the market. Be-
cause the market has been differentiated cat-
egorically from civil society, the intersubjective
origin of this economic regulator has been seri-
ously distorted. Hence returning organizations
to their base in civil society can have a very posi-
tive impact on the development of citizens. For
example, when order is established on this foun-
dation, persons have intimate knowledge of one
another, build their relationships on interper-
sonally validated trust, and generate solidarity
through their regular intervention into public
space. As a result, associations that are
grounded in civil society provide persons with a
terrific sense of security.
Constant engagement that encourages per-
sons to defend one another is essential to the
creation and preservation of an open and free
society. This intervention is a virtue, rather than
a nuisance. Consumers are crippled in this re-
spect, and thus are incapable of achieving any
security. There are no lasting relationships at
the marketplace, but instead tenuous friendships
that may have to be sacrificed at any moment
to the demands of the so-called bottom line.
Citizenship, on the other hand, cannot be
this ephemeral. Therefore, democracy is in se-
rious trouble in modern societies, if the citizen
is replaced by the consumer. For without trust,
mutual defense, and collective responsibility, a
society is condemned to devolve into a morass
of accusations, suspicions, and insecurities. No-
one will assume that there is any benefit to en-
gaging others in a long-term, collective project.
Why, therefore, should society exist at all?
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